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3 ]ournalists' Perceptions of 
populism and the Media 
A Cross-National Study Based 
on Semi-Structured Interviews 
James Stanyer, Susana Salgado, Giuliano 
Bobba, Gergõ Hajzer, Davi,d Nicolas 
Hopmann, Nicolas Hubé, Norbert 
Merkovity, Gokay Ozerim, 'Stylianos 
Papathanassopoulos, Karen B. Sanders, 
Dusan Spasojevic, and Lenka Vochocová 1 
Introduction 
While numerous studies have looked ar the media coverage of populism 
and populist politicians (for a synopci account, see Aalberg, Esser, Reine-
mann, rrômbãck de Vree e, 2017), few, if any have oughc tO try 
to und r tand tlle phenomenon from the p r pective of those seeking to 
report ' n populism. iven the importance of the media to the spl'ead and 
' ucce of populi t partie acrOSs Europe, understanding the perc plions 
of joucnaJises i crucial. The news media are a centra l source oI politicaI 
information for publics and politicians, and journalisr ' are key in haping 
chat infoan3tion. ln chi, volume, Mamer et a I. ob erve chat journali ts' 
perception ar influential on the 'way news tOl'ie and opinlon pieces 
are written, ineluding the decision ab ut if and whar populist messages 
should be included (p. 104). ln this contexc it is important to know how 
í urnalist undcrstand che politicai phenomenon they report on and how 
chey make sense of ir. WhiJe there have been numerou tudie of i ur-
nalises' perceprions in diffcrent c mexes ( ee, for example, tr"mback & 
KarLson, 2011; Van Dalen & Van Aelst, 2014) a far a we an tell, jour-
nalisti understanding of pop'trli m have nor been expLored in any depth 
and none to our knowledge, have done thi in a omparative Contexto 
Journali r opera te witb working definitions of who popuJist are and 
what poplllism i but populi rn has been described a a slippery concept) 
difficult to define (Taggart, 2000). How do journali t comprehend what 
i or is nor popuList? Definitions are important in labe ling pareies and 
actors and drawing an audience <'menti n to tbo e actor and thei . policy 
positions. We do flOt know what kind of definirion journali t ue. Are 
the label app li ed with any critica i refi tion.? Do negative definitions 
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d 'nate? It migbt w II b thar rhe dominanc p rception are negative. Oill l h I' I . '1 TI rnajority of pr vi u I'e ear h ugge ts t at popu I m la prlmarl y 
;ative con equence for dem cracie but it wa nor lear whether chi n~ew i shared among journali t (Bartolini , 2011' Levitsky & Loxton ~~13; Mudde, 2004· Pa quino, 2008). Ir could be th~t v~ew are m .re 
nuanced. For instance, it might be important to determme If these partles 
are on the left, or right, of the politicaI spectr.um. 
If journalists' perceptions are unknown, thelr thoughts about the causes 
and consequences of populism are also unknown. For exampl.e, w~at do 
'ournalists attribute responsibility for the rise of populism to? Is It mamly to ~emand factors such as immigration or the economic crisis, or to supply-side 
factors such as the charismatic qualities of particular politicians? Again, in 
terms of the social and politicai consequences of populism, do journalists see 
these as negative in the main? We might expect negative perceptions to domi-
nate, but we do not know. Finally, what do journalists make of the role of 
the media in the ris e and spread of populism? Research in this volume sheds 
light on populist media and media reporting of populists. It suggests that 
the media may well play a role in the promotion of populism and populists. 
Previous research has observed that journalists, as a profession, share 
much across borders, including 'coherent values, role perceptions and 
beliefs' (see pfetsch, 2014). Given this, we might expect that there is suf-
ficient commonality in how those interviewed understand populism, its 
causes and consequences, their own role, and that of the media more gener-
ally, in its spread. These common understandings might emerge from jour-
nalists' news consumption as part of an inter-media agenda-setting process 
and the ubiquity of news online (Cassidy, 2007). That said, it could be that 
some clear differences emerge. For example, in this volume, Maurer et a!. 
find that the more adversaria I role perceptions are rooted in a country, 
the more populism is reported-similarly with predominance of market-
oriented role perceptions. Whereas, where pedagogic role perceptions are 
more engrained, populist messages are less prevalent in that country. These 
are of course correlations, but they suggest that understandings of populism 
may differ according to varying journalistic role perceptions. 
Another source of distinction might be related to the media out/et 
within which journalists work. Mazzoleni (2014) argues that tabloid 
media play a role in the promulgation of populism and are most likely 
to 'give 'passionate attention to what happens in the usually animated 
precincts of populist movements' (Mazzoleni, Stewart, & Horsfield, 2003, 
p. 16; see also Stanyer, 2007). However, in this volume Maurer et aI. 
found that across ali countries in their sample, there was no relationship 
between the volume of populist news stories and whether a media oudet 
was mass-rnarket or up-market (but see Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & 
Wirth, 2018 for somewhat different findings) . 
On the politicai front, events and circumsrances in national politicai 
life such as the presence, success, or failure of populist politicians, can 
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b said t eXert ao irnpo.rtanr influ nce on how populi m., it~ cause, and 
°t eOIl equ Ilee. mighr be understood. ln several COllntneS ln the tlldy, 
; opllli r parries were in power and ir i po ible rhat this might xert 
me inflllence 00 perceptions (s e Hameleer et aI., 2018 for a similar 
argument and findings supporting this notion). 
As noted in the chapter by Salgado and Stanyer, this current chapter 
draws on qualitative research interviews to provide an insight into the 
views of news professionals across 13 countries from Northern, East-
ern, and Southern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; France; Greece; Hungary; Romania; Italy; Portugal; 
Serbia; Spain; and Turkey). The aim of the in-depth interviews has been 
to tease out journalists' understanding of popdlism, allowing journalists 
to respond in their own words. More informa~ion about methods used 
in the study can be found in the chapter by Salgado and Stanyer. This 
chapter focuses on five key areas which guided the qualitative interviews. 
These are: what journalists understand by the concept of populism; the 
identification of populist politicians; the issues most related to the rise of 
populism; its perceived consequellces; and, whether the media are sup-
portive, criticaI, or, indeed, whether they behave in a populist manner. 
Understanding What Is Meant by Populism 
At the start of the interviews, journalists were asked what they understood 
by the term populism, in arder to learn more about what they recognize 
as populism and how they perceive it. The aim was to elicit some work-
ing definitions that they employ to decide who, in the world of politics, is 
populist and who is noto Some of the main themes which emerged from 
the responses of the journalists, are set out below. 
Populism as an Ideology 
Most (for a definition of how this term is used, please see the chapter 
by Salgado and Stanyer) interviewees saw populism as an ideology ar 
something re!ated to the appeal of individual politicians. Further, it was 
often made sense of as a general trend in the European and international 
context (especially in relation to the US, Russia, and Venezuela). Only a 
minority (far a definition of how this term is used, please see chapter by 
Salgado and Stanyer) of those interviewed provided a weak and unclear 
definition of populismo 
Populism as an Electoral Strategy 
For some journalists interviewed, populism could be considered 'a neces-
sary and universal politicai strategy', given there were 'traces of populism 
in the program of almost every politicai party' (Czech Republic). Popu-
lism is, according to this opinion, 'aimed at voting' (Greece), or 'politicai 
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arketing ( zech Republi l. Some emphasized the more negative ele-~ent f this describing it as shallow akin to the selling of appearance 
( pain), pare of the politicai game full of demag gy and over- implification 
(Portugal ) in order to gain p pularity with o er- implistie me age (Por-
tugal and Hllngary), with n real value propo ai (Portugal). Eut, iJl thi 
ontext a maj rity (f r a definition of how rlLi rerm i li ed plea e e 
Chapter 2 in this volume) spoke of 'lies' and 'manipulation' and mak-
ing 'unrealistic promises', while others observed it was appealing to 'the 
lowest passions' (Serbian journalist) of voters. The general view was that 
populism was not specific to any party, but more a means of achiev-
ing electoral success via dishonesty and manipulation. These views were 
expressed in all the countries of our sample. 
populism as a Problematic Concept 
Some journalists were more criticai of the concept itself, especially those 
from France (Hubé & Truan, 2016). The French journalists interviewed 
considered populism a 'buzzword in the media, an insult to defame a 
politicai opponent'. TheRomanian and Italian journalists were also criti-
cai of the interpreta tive dimension of this concept ('The ideological posi-
tions of these movements strongly differs') (ltalian journalist), so that 
populism is a tool to describe politicai competition. Similarly, a Czech 
journalist with a center-right perspective considered populism an artificial 
labe! used to discredit politicai opponents, and he refused to differentiate 
between populist and traditional politics since populist tendencies can be, 
according to him, traced to the program of any politicaI party. 
Populism as Pejora tive Label 
The interviews also explored whether journalists saw populism as a posi-
tive or negative force or something that had both positive and negative 
impacts. Across alI 13 countries, populism was seen overwhelmingly as 
negative, with most considering it to be a malign force. This was similar to 
the views of the politicians interviewed, with the exception of those from 
populist parties (see Salgado et aI. in this volume). ln comparison, there 
were far fewer mixed responses, and only a smalI number of journalists 
in eight countries acknowledged any positive aspects. There were no clear 
patterns in the mixed responses, which carne from journalists across the 
politicaI spectrum and from those working for different media outlets. 
The most positive views carne from a journalist who worked for an online 
right-wing populist media oudet in Hungary. 
Identifying Populist Politicians 
Interviewees were asked to provide examples of populist politicians, both 
in their own countries and abroad. Most were able to name at least one 
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politician in their own country. ln some countries, there was a clear con-
sensus across the different media outlets about who these actors were. 
ln Bosnia, for example, those journalists questioned referred to Milorad 
Dodik, a Bosnian politician. ln Serbia, President Aleksandar Vucié was 
mentioned. ln Spain, journalists referred to Pablo Iglesias and Podemos. 
ln most countries, journalists mentioned two or more examples. ln the 
Czech Republic, the November 2017 e!ection results signified a huge 
shift in Czech politics, as the established parties lost a significant part 
of their e!ectoral support and previous minority or non-parliamentary 
parties succeeded. Three (out of four) journalists named those new party 
leaders (new Prime Minister Andrej Babis, a Çzech oligarch; President 
Milos Zeman or, more generally, the ANO mqvement) as the ideal rep-
resentation of populismo ln some countries where populist parties have 
been successful in recent elections (Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, and Serbia), journalists named a current party leader (for 
example Alexis Tsipras, Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, or Jean-Luc Melé-
nchon) as quintessentially populist. 
ln severa I instances, though, the journalists avoided or refused to give an 
example, or suggested that ali politicians could be populist. For example, 
in Hungary, only one journalist cited Viktor Orbán; the others declined 
to name anyone. ln some cases, there seemed to be a re!uctance to point 
to an obvious example. ln Turkey, none of the journalists labeled Turkish 
President Erdogan as populist despite this label being applied e!sewhere 
in Western news media. 
When asked to provi de examples of a populist politician outside of 
their country, most had a similar idea of who was a populist politician. 
There is clearly a common idea among the journalists of the personifica-
tion of a populist politician. Ali interviewees identified Donald Trump; 
others, but not ali, mentioned Marine Le Pen in France, Bepe Grillo in 
Italy, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Nigel Farage in the UK. Ali 
of these actors have been especially prominent in international news over 
the period of the study. 
ln addition to internationally newsworthy politicians, interviewees also 
mentioned examples in neighboring countries, or countries where there 
was some cultural affinity. For example, respondents from Bosnia named 
a politician in Croatia; those from Serbia mentioned Vladimir Putin (a 
name absent from other interviews); those from Turkey mentioned the 
AfD in Germany and Alexis Tsipras in Greece. Overall, there were no 
clear patterns by country, media type, or politicaI persuasion in terms of 
identifying populist politicians. 
ln sum, the interviews provided insight into the working definitions of 
populism used by journalists. For some, populism was an ideology and for 
others an electoral strategy implemented by politicians. Others still were 
criticai of the term, seeing it as a problematic label and, as some noted, 
an 'empty signifier' (Spain) or an 'empty vesse!' (Czech Republic). Most 
Jaurnalists' Perceptians af Papulism 39 
saw p pulism as Ullequivocally negative with only a minority mentioning 
passible po itive a pect . All could point to parties and p liticians widely 
under t od to be populist. 
When the authors looked for any evidence of difference between coun-
tries, type of media (TV, print, or Internet), or effect of the politicai posi-
tioning of the media, Iittle could be found. lndeed, journalists working for 
papulist-supporting media outlets defined populism similarly to journal-
ists working for mainstream or serious news media. 
Reasons for the Popularity of Populist 
Leaders and Parties 
Journali ts were asked what th y con idered to be the reasons for the 
popuJarity of populist Leaders and pareies aud about the ocial i ue most 
linked to the rise of populism in their countries. The aim was tO tea e out 
any significant themes related to populism expressed by journalists. This 
section seeks to identify any shared or unique features which journalists 
consider to be important in understanding the rise of populism in their 
country, including the irppact of international and/or national factors, the 
part played by the personal characteristics of particular politicaI actors, 
and the possible role of the media. The journalists' responses were divided 
into demand-side factors, deriving from international and national politi-
caI and economic conditions, and supply-side factors, related to the nature 
af the populist response (see Mudde, 2007). 
Demand-Side Factors 
Immigratian 
Starting with the demand-side conditions, the most common theme raised 
by ali countries and by the majority of journalists was immigration and 
the refugee crisis, which is an understandable finding given the migration 
of people from the Middle East to Europe, and the capability of European 
leaders to form an effective respanse to the crisis. ln the case of Italy, this 
can be understood as a consequence of the fact that ltaly has proven to be 
an important host country in Europe for refugees and immigrants. How-
ever, immigration was also mentioned in countries not strongly affected 
by the European migration crisis. The example of the Czech Republic, 
where immigration is considered one of the main populist topics despite 
the fact that its impact on the country was minimal, reveals, according to 
Czech journalists, ways in which populists use these 'made-up problems' 
to exploit peoples' fears and their 'feeling of being under threat, both 
from the inside and from the outside'. Journalists from Bosnia, the Czech 
Republic, Iraly, and Turkey emphasized the migrant crisis and the associ-
ated perceived eco no mie strains. 
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While in most countries immigration was seen as the main issue associ-
ated with the ris e of populism, this was by no means the sarne for ali coun-
tries. Among the 13 countries, journalists in Spain, Bosnia, and Romania, 
regardless of the politicai orientation of media outlets, did not associate 
populism with immigration or the refugee crisis at alI. Economic issues 
were seen as important factors in Spain, Greece, and Romania, and a 
number of nationally specific issues also emerged (see below). 
Financial Crisis 
Many interviewees mentioned economic issues asone of the main driv-
ers of populist support. The economic recession b~ginning in 2008, and 
the period of economic austerity and unemployment that followed, was 
cited as a significant factor by journalists from Spain, Greece, ltaly, and 
Portugal (see also, for example, de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & 
Stanyer, 2018, and the introduction to this book). ln some cases, such as 
Italy, the disadvantaged economic position of the younger generation with 
poor job prospects was perceived as a precondition for populist popular-
ity. ln Italy, two of the journalists interviewed suggested that younger 
voters with no memory of war and dictatorship had little knowledge of, 
or interest in, politics, and their disengagement had also contributed to the 
rise of populismo Journalists from Bulgaria cited disparities between their 
country and older and wealthier EU Member States as providing fertile 
ground for populismo This observation seems to echo the idea that rela tive 
deprivation may be a key driver of populist success (see the chapter by 
Hameleers, Andreadis, & Reinemann in this volume). 
Spanish and Romanian journalists made connections between the 
financial crisis and the increase of inequality, income and social welfare 
issues, poverty risk, unemployment and corruption-all described as 
social scourges. However, for journalists belonging to countries outside 
the Eurozone (such as Hungary and Turkey), financial recession was not 
perceived as a topic associated with populismo 
A range of issues connected to the financial crisis were also mentioned. 
These included unemployment or low wages (Portugal, Greece, Hungary, 
Spain, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, France); low living standards among 
European citizens, which took many forms, such as poverty (Hungary, 
Spain, Serbia, Bulgaria); home evictions (Spain); social inequality (ltaly, 
Spain, France, Czech Republic); retirement reforms (Denmark, Serbia); 
taxes (Denmark, France, Czech Republic); corruption (Spain, Portugal, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Czech Republic); or promises of lowering prices of 
selected popular goods as a populist strategy (Czech Republic). 
Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities 
The examples of Bosnia and Serbia reveal how specific national con-
texts and history influence the topics set by populist politicians-it is 
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,redomillantly the ethnic issue c1ear1y rclated r nacional alld ethlli 
:e1acionships in former Yugo lavian cOllntrie (ethni right and ter-
rira ria ! division , centralization v . fUl'ther divi i n f che c untl'y, 
nationalism a the on equence of he bre kup oi Yugo lavia) thar 
journalists in Serbia and Bosnia, regardless of their ideological inclina-
tions, mention as priorities on the populist agenda. Bulgarian journal-
ists stressed the importance of 'the catastrophic demographic problem' 
(aging, emigration, low birth rate) leading nearly to the 'disappear-
ance' of Bulgaria and the unresolved ethnic problem (the integration 
of the Roma people) as the main populist issues. Fear of terrorism was 
also raised (Portugal). 
Religion 
ln France, journalists considered lslam to be an issue and explained the 
predominance of lslamophobia in populist rhetoric as a consequence 
of the proliferation of jihadist attacks in France, and the concentration 
of people of Muslim faith in certain, often disadvantaged, districts of 
large French cities. ln T\lrkey, journalists raised religious issues, the 
Kurdish question, ethnicity, cultural diversity, and security concerns. 
Most of these special issues of a local nature, combined with other 
more usual topics such as the refugee crisis and wages, are seen by the 
three Turkish journalists not merely as the cause of populism, but as 
a servant of it. 
Two Spanish journalists, working for right-wing and left-wing out-
lets, raised specific social themes. The first related populism to the 
decline of important institutions, such as church and family. Specifi-
cally, he referred to the special issue of anti-clericalism, aimed at edu-
cating people to hate the institution of the Church, as well as to a 'tribal 
education conception', meaning the disappearance of family unity ('tra-
ditional family' as an important populist topic is also mentioned by a 
Romanian journalist with a center-Ieft leaning). The second journalist 
associated populism with the reformation of the education and health 
system in Spain. 
Among the less common themes raised were the necessary protection 
of Christianity and the danger of destruction of the European Christian 
civilization (Serbia and Bulgaria's center to center-right journalists). 
PoliticaI Elites 
Journalists identified the actions of politicai elites as an issue. While a 
right-wing Serbian journalist connected anti-elitism with conspiracy 
theories and attacks against the 'enemies of the people', the Czech public 
service and left-wing journalists mentioned the 'urban elites', intellectu-
ais, the traditional/mainstream media, and people with an education in 
the humanities (the so-called 'coffee house' set) as the typical targets of 
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populi t critici m. European (di )integration and EU criticism as impor-
tam popllli r i ue are mentioned by center to left-wing journali t trom 
France, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. That aid, Euro ceptici m i 
not as widespread as might have first been thought. 
Crisis af Demacracy 
One of the most frequent responses related populism's rise to a perceived 
crisis of liberal democracy and, in particular, the lack oI resp nsiveness 
of mainstream politicai parti. who have lo t the trll t of ociecy and 
are perceived to be an lite in.i t ing OH consen ual ollltion . ]ournalists 
acro Europe saw thi crisis of legitimacy a lea~ing to voter di engage-
ment Erom main tream politics' some nored pecifically weak national 
democratic cultures (Bosnia, Serbia, Turkey). 
There were other demand-side issues mentioned by journalists. Glo-
balization was raised by journalists from Bosnia and the Czech Republic 
as the driving force b hind changing valu leading to ocial hange in 
gay and minority rights. Journali t from the Czech Republi ai O tited 
Ru sian interference contributing tO coaIu ioo and di tru t in the zech 
Republic. These were references from journalists working in media outlets 
with different politicai orientations. 
Supply-Side Factors 
ln terms of supply-side factors, interviewees were asked whether the per-
sonal characteristics of particular politicaI actors played a role in popu-
lism's popularity. Almost all journalists (apart from those from Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Portugal, and France) thought they did noto Howeve.r, 
journa li t from Bo aia erbia, and (caly referred tO the importance of 
pal'ticular politician in gain ing uppOrt for popuU m and an ltalian jour-
nalist ai O referred to the role of hari ma. A econd rea on given by jom-
nalists related to populist poJiticians' and parties' effective response to the 
trends mentioned above. Populist politicians and parties were perceived 
as openly naming problems and raising important issues that people are 
concerned about such as unemployment, corruption, and migration. 
Re pondent pointed to their abi lity tO trigger powerful emotions 
sucb a h pe and fear. A journali [ from Bosnia uggested thar populi ts 
know how to play che fear card by inventing thl':at 01~ in the opinion of 
aoother Bosnian journalist, fanning nati,onali t feelings. J urnali t Erom 
the Czech Rcpuhüc Bulgaria and Greece stated thar populi ts Iie tO the 
people bm that chey do so in a way which eem to make complicated 
is ues comprehensible. rndeed, one of the key reasons for [heir popularity 
il1 the vi.cw of mo t j urnali ts, wa precisely this abiJicy to offer appar-
ently simple oll1tions to complex i l1es tbat are under tood by ordi-
nary people. P pulist politi ian were ac u ed oI aying what the people 
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want tO hear and in the view of journalist trom Bulgaria and Hungary 
engaging with their dreams and their frustratiom, offering them elves a a 
kiod of mes iah 01' savior. Journalis from Jtaly mention d bow populist 
campaign manage t align them eJves uccessfully with pllblic opinion 
and use an 'Americanized' or professionalized approach to campaigns. 
JOllrnalists fr m Romania, Greece, and Portugal suggested that the suc-
cesS of UKIP, Donald Trump and Brexit had provided a spur to populism. 
Populists in Greece, Portugal, and ltaly were considered to target less well-
educated groups and those who live in rural and marginalized areas and 
follow politics through television and social media rather than through 
newspapers. 
ln sum, there was commonality in journalists' views across Europe 
about the reasons for populism's popularity, with some nationally spe-
cific causes being identified in individual countries. There was litde differ-
ence in views between journalists working for mainstream news outlets 
and those considered to be populist, nor in relation to the ideological 
profiles of media outlets or between regions. Ir should be noted that 
in the view of some journalists, any issue had the capacity to be popu-
list. Two journalists in Hungary, both of whom work for media outlets 
of center-Ieft politicaI orientation, argued that populism can be related 
to anything, in the sense that populist approaches can be applied to 
any social issue. A Danish journalist, working for a tabloid newspaper, 
claimed, in a similar way, that 'any issue can be discussed in a populist 
manner'. For these journalists it was not so much the issue itself, but 
more the way it was communicated to the public-any issue could be 
expressed in a populist manner. 
The Consequences of Populism 
Given that populism was seen overwhelmingly as a malign force, the 
probability that the consequences of populism were ais o seen as mainly 
negative was aIs o high. When journalists were asked by the interviewers 
what they thought the consequences of populism were, both for their own 
countries and for democracies generally, the picture painted by journalists 
across the sample was clear: Populism had mainly negative consequences 
for democracy, both in their own country and in general. ln fact, ali jour-
nalists from Bosnia, Czech Republic, Greece, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, 
and Portugal only referred to negative consequences. 
Negative Consequences 
Journali t frequentJy mentioned that p pu li m delegitimizes democracy 
and it institution in rheir countries (for example Bosnia, Greece, ltaly, 
Rornania Serb.ia or Spain), ir \eads to more polarization and in some 
cases, even radicalization and fear-mongering (mentioned by journalists 
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in Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Serbia, Turkey, and 
France). Populism also degrades public debates by over-simplifying 
complicated societal issues and ignoring 'real' problems (mentioned by 
journalists in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, ltaly, Portugal, or Serbia), or exac-
erbating bigotry, racism, prejudices, and xenophobic attitudes. The main 
consequences for democracy in general were related to its overall under-
mining of trust in its institutions. The economic and policy consequences 
mentioned by journalists were also mostly just as negative. For example, 
populism leads to poor decisions for the economy and to ineffective and 
overly biased policy-making. 
Positive Consequenees 
, 
Only four journalists (from Hungary, Italy, Spain, France) mentioned that 
populism has positive consequences, and from these, only one (Hungary) 
was employed at a media outlet labeled as populist by journalists. The 
positive consequences included were, first, increased citizen participation. 
The appearance of populist movements can further inclusionary politics 
by expanding democratic participation of previously marginalized social 
groups and by introducing different issues into the agenda. Second, some 
noted the revitalization of democracy and a renewal of the politicai class 
as a potential positive outcome. Populism may also have a positive conse-
quence for the development of democratic societies. Such benefits of popu-
lism can be observed in Latin American populism, and it was discussed in 
Europe with the emergence of politicai actors such as Podemos in Spain. 
The most commonly mentioned positive effects were associated with the 
politicai system, the quality and resilience of democracy, particularly rep-
resentative democracy, and democratic institutions. Social effects were also 
considered in the sense of populism improving politicai participation. 
Although, according to this sample of journalists, the consequences 
were not the sarne everywhere, some patterns emerged. The tendency 
to consider populism harmful was more pronounced when journalists 
carne from countries with populist politicai actors in government. Tak-
ing social effects as another example, these can be mainly positive or 
negative depending on whether interviewees are thinking about left or 
right-wing populismo lt was notable that some consequences of populism 
seem to overarch most perspectives: radicalization of positions and over-
simplification of issues. 
ln sum, the themes that emerge from the interviews about the conse-
quences were de-Iegitimization and erosion of democratic institutions, 
lack of trust in representative democracy, shallow politics, malleability 
of the truth, instrumentalization of fear and anxiety, fragmentation, and 
discrimination; but, on a positive note, citizen participation and renewal 
of politics. Moreover, journalists across countries seem to agree on these 
themes with limited systematic differences across the sample. 
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Media Outlets as Supporters or Critics of Populism 
jOllrnali.st w re. ~ ked if medi~ olltlets in tlteir counrries w re broadly 
lIpportlve r nU ai of populJsm. The r pon cs perhaps nor urpris-
ingl)', wcre varied. The analysis of thc interview howed thar in mo t of 
the ountries rhe new media were een to be cr iticai of popuU m and it 
was only in the cases of Bosnia, Greece, and Turkey that all the interview-
ees stated that in general the media were not criticai regardless of the type 
of media and its politicai leaning. Portugal was the only country where 
ali journalists agreed that the media tends to be criticai toward populist 
discourse. ln the words of a journalist, a possible explanation is the criti-
cai awareness by journalists of the consequences of this type of politics. 
Media as enties af Papulism 
A common feature in most of the interviews was that left-wing media 
outlets were considered to be the main opponents of populismo This was 
also the case for quality newspapers where journalists seemed to be more 
aware of their social role and democratic responsibility, compared to 
other media. A good ex'ample can be found in the interviewee fram a 
French center-Ieft quality newspaper, who underlined that there was a 
criticai consensus: 'It is consensual to criticize [populism] and therefore-
as a backlash-we are harshly criticized [in our turn]. This strengthens 
the break between media and populism'. Another feature was that for the 
mass-market or tabloid media, the boundary between the popular and 
populists was blurred since they want to speak the language of the people, 
leading to an increasing simplification and dramatization of politics. 
Media as Supparters af Papulism 
ln Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, the media are widely perceived 
as supportive of and, to some degree, the creators of populism and popu-
listic messages, while in ltaly, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and France, the 
media is largely seen as challenging populismo This ties to some extent 
with the findings of Blassnig et aI. in this volume, which show journalists 
are most likely to include populist messages in the news in Bulgaria and 
Greece, and least likely in ltaly and Serbia. 
One of the primary reasons for media support for populist policies 
mentioned by journalists in the sample countries was media owner-
ship by politicai actors and the economic power and politicai power of 
ruling elites, induding governments. Politicai ties and dose relations 
of media and politicai actors were frequently cited by the journalists. 
Other factors were also considered. Rather than explanations based on 
the centrality of politicai actors' power, in Greece and Hungary, inter-
viewed journalists suggested that 'politicai stances of media institutions' 
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were a determicing factor for upport for púpuList p licie . A a result, 
pro-government media can be sllpportive, whiJe 0Ppo itiol1 media take 
a more criticai tance. ln the Greek ca e the media wa perceived a the 
promoter f popllli m becau e of a mutual neecl for implification and 
becallse of populi t production of fake n w .ln ltaly, it was considered 
that the media boo t popu li m by covering their permanent politicai 
campaigniug. Some interviewees identified the underlying rea ous for 
media upport such as media owner hip and t[ong t.ies etween media 
wner t journajists anel politicaI actor, a an i ue (Bo nia, Czech 
Republic France) Greece Hungary, Romania, Serbia)' in rher chey 
identified mail media market (l3ulgaria Hungacy) and lack: of trong 
journalist stanelarels (Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Ser-
bia, Spain, Tllrkey). ; 
Some of these characteristics were linkeel to the socialization of the 
elite (stl'ong ties berween own rs or jOllrnali ts anel p litician , or jour-
nalisti tandard) while others are much cio er to the media market, 
which i linked to economic questions (small market). Moreúver, severa I 
aspect reJated to ehe relevance of popullst pareies ln the politicai anel 
parIiamentary life of a givcn countq, the politicai leaning of th media 
outlets considered and the cype of meelia, i.e., quality/public vs. tabloid/ 
commercial media. 
However, media support for populism is also con idered an outcome 
of the media's own deficiencies. For instance, in Bo nia, the analysis of 
our sample shows that poor regulation or lack of unelerstaneling about 
the role of media in democracies can encourage support for populist 
policies through certain new media outlet . Lastly media was asslUned 
to be organically populist in some cOllnrl'ie uch a Bulgaria, erbia, 
and Twkey acting a a mediator between politicai actors and the public 
nan mitting poplllist discour e and policies . The characterization oE 
the media by me journalists as a m diator of populi morre pond 
with this idea. 
What could be seen in popular media was that they give space to 
pOpllU m through opinionated arti le. ince the thoughts or ometimes 
even the lines, from one article appear in artiele by other media, the 
connection between the e media outlet are vi ible. Some of che inter-
viewecs described this proce a .ly functional pre . orne interviewee 
noted that ome journalists are standing with populi t parties; therefor 
manipulatecl 01' moderated mes ages wi ll dominar the news cyele that 
willlllldermine the non-populi t media's agenda. 
ln sum, overall there were no clear patterns acro countries Or regi ou . 
ln some thc media were eeo a upportive, while in others they were 
criticai. T he reason fOr uppon otten concerned politicai ties a lack 
of trong journaljstic randard Or competi tive media rnarket. Overall 
where there was more critiei m. it wa perceived to emanare from left-
leaning media anel quality newspapers. 
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Conclusion 
The .inrerview. pr?videel valllable in igbt into media professionals' per-
ceptl n f p ~uh ~ and populi t polirician . The design aJlowed for 
importaot con Ieleratlon of the naciona l and media contexts in order to 
enable the authúr to detect any partern in pereeptiolls. 
. Perhaps not surpris!ngly, ali th~s.e interviewed were aware of popu-
hsm and~ perhap~ agam.not surpnsmgly, there was no single definition 
of p~p.u!Jsm. AI~ J?~nall t mterviewed were able to provi de a working 
defiOltl.on, even 1~ Ir 111 ome cases it was vague. The emphasis variecl. For 
some, lt was ano I.deology and for others, it was, in effect, electioneering, 
part of the pol~tlcal game. Others emphasized the problematic nature 
of the concept Itself, it being, in the words of one journalist an empt 
signifier,. ~ label that. could be applieel in a variety of contexts. 'There wa~ 
some criticai refle~tlOn, if limited to a few journalists. Most journalists 
were able to provlde examples of populist politicians from their own 
countrles and although some were reticent about naming any alI 
bl . . . , were a e t? pomt to IllternatlOnal examples. Most definitions accentuated the 
negative, al~hough a very small minority identified positive positions too. 
. ln reflectlllg on the reasons for the popularity of populist journalists, 
It ,:as ~lear :hat there were several demand and supply-side factors such 
~s Imm:~r~tlOn, and the ~bility of po?ul~sts to capitalize on these. Popu-
!ISt pohtlclans were cons.l~ered effeetlve m responding to problems. This 
mterplay between condltlOns and politicians seemed to be true across 
countries and media outlets. 
l~ t~rms of the issues underlying populism, immigration was seen as the 
mam lssue assoeiated with the.rise of populism, however, this was by no 
m~~ns the sarne for ali countnes. Eeonomic issues, such as the financial 
cnSIS, were seen ~s important factors in Spain, Greece, anel Romania, anel 
a ~u:nb~r of natlOnally specific issues also emerged. Others pointed to 
rellglOn m ~eneral and lsIam in particular, and ethnic minority/majority 
group r~latlOns. !hese wer: interr lated themes, affecting mainly the 
economlc pro ~enty an,d oClal cobe ion ofEuropean ocieties. Generally, 
I~owe.ver, the Vlew of Journ~llst regardin the key issue driyjng popu-
11 m. se m to ~eflect eh: findm s of aeademic re earch ( ee, for example, 
~he l ~tJ:odllctlon tO tbls volume). Therefore we can a ert that at lea r 
m thls ~es~ect, decisions on how to cover populisr actors and the social 
underplUntng of their success seem to be grounded in appropriate notions 
of the problem. 
. ~he journalists were a,:are of the consequences of populismo Again, these 
wele een.a largelyoe atlve across countrie anel induded: de-Iegirimization 
anel erO J n oI de . t" . . I k f . 
. mo I.a. IC IllStltutl?~S' ac o tru t m represenrarive 
demo raey; hallow polltles; maJleabillty of the rruth· in trllmenralization 
of fear and anxiety; fragmentation; and discrimination. On a positive note 
some mentioned increased citizen participation and renewal of politics: 
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This negative sense was especially paJpable in countries where populists 
were in government. There was also variation depending on whether the 
journalists were referring to right or left-wing populism, the latter being 
seen more positively. There was also a tendency to éonsider populism to 
be harmfuJ when journalists carne from countries where populist politicai 
actors were in government. ln terms of the social effects, whether these 
were mainly positive or negative depended to some extent on whether 
interviewees were thinking about left or right-wing populismo 
ln reflecting on the role of the media in the ris e of populism, some 
journalists considered the media to be supportive while others considered 
it criticaI. They articulated the reasons for media support for populism as 
related to politicai ties and Jack of strong journalist standards or a com-
petitive media market. Overall, criticai media tend~d to be the left-leaning 
media and quality news outlets. This, however, is perhaps not surprising 
given the fact that in most of the countries under study, right-wing popu-
!ist parties have been more successful than left-wing parties. 
As noted, those involved in the study were interested in whether there 
were any clear patterns in journalists' perceptions of populismo There 
were no clear regional differences in our sample on any of the issues. 
Obviously, the respective national situations regarding populism and the 
part played by the media had a huge impact on perceptions of populismo 
Similar to other results presented in this book, this finding suggests that 
over-generalizing the causes and mechanisms involved in populist success 
may often be inappropriate. There was also little distinction between the 
media outlets journalists work for. Our findings echo Maurer et aI. in 
this volume, although those working for outlets that supported populist 
parties did have a more positive view of populism than those who did 
noto There were some shared perceptions in some countries in the study 
where populist parties were in power, but this by no means applied to alI. 
Overall, the lack of strong patterns might be a product of the sample size 
and the nature of the sample, but also might suggest that journalists share 
many common understandings of populism, its causes and consequences, 
their own role, and that of the media more generally in populism's spread. 
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Introduction 
Why is it important to study politicians' perceptions of populism? The 
way in which something is regarded and understood is of the utmost 
importance for its impact on politics and society in general. Given the 
complexities in defining 'populism' and understanding its meaning, and 
in view of it being commonly referred to as a 'vague', 'slippery', 'elusive' 
concept (e.g., Canovan, 1981, 1984; Taggart, 2000; Barr, 2009; Lucardie, 
2009; Woods, 2014), this study addresses the concept and its potential 
implications through the views of politicians wbo r present some of the 
most important politicaI parties in 11 European countries and who are 
cherefore important opinion-maker . The main objective i tO di cern 
what politicialls irom the variou countries and different types of politi-
caI parties understand by populism and how they perceive the cau es and 
implications of the e pheno01ena in their cOlLOtries, and, more broadly, 
in European and global cont Xt • 
Interview wc.: conducted with politicians from 11 European cOllntries: 
Bosllia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Denmark Greece Hungary, Italy 
orway, PoJélnd Portugal Romania and pain. The ample i therefore 
compo ed of countrics representing different region in Europe, inclllding 
from otlthea tem Bastern el1~ral rthem, and outh rn Em p . Tbe 
politicaJ parties were e1ected taking into account theil' overall eJectoral 
expre sion in their re pective countrie and their repre entativenes on the 
right· left p litical pectrum. ln addition, p puli t and non-populist par-
tie were included in ali countrie ex ept Romania. The study therefore 
include a varied ample f po.1itical parties including main tream and 
fringe nter-Ieft and center-right radical and/or extreme left and right 
and populí t and non-populist partie (for ful'ther informatioD ab ut th 
